This paper evaluates how the global financial crisis emanating from the U.S. was transmitted to emerging markets. Our focus is on the extent that the crisis caused external market pressures (EMP), and whether the absorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation or the loss of international reserves. Controlling for variety of factors associated with EMP, we find clear evidence that emerging markets with higher total foreign liabilities, including short-and long-term debt, equities, FDI and derivative products-had greater exposure and were much more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Countries with large balance sheet exposure --high external portfolio liabilities exceeding international reserves-absorbed the global shock by allowing greater exchange rate depreciation and comparatively less reserve loss. Despite the remarkable buildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the period prior to the financial crisis, countries relied primarily on exchange rate depreciation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchange market pressure shock. This could reflect a deliberate choice ("fear of reserve loss" or competitive depreciations) or market actions that caused very rapid exchange rate adjustment, especially in emerging markets with open capital markets, overwhelming policy actions.
Introduction
International financial markets were at the heart of the world-wide financial crisis that emerged in late 2007 and reached a climax between August 2008 and February 2009 . Although the crisis started with mortgage-related (sub-prime) crisis in the United States, and was closely linked to banks in Western Europe holding mortgagebacked securities and derivative products, it quickly led to global liquidity crisis that caused financial market turmoil through the rest of the world.
We focus in this paper on the extent to which the global financial shock adversely affected the external position of emerging market economies. We measure external position by looking at changes in exchange market pressure-a combination of exchange market depreciation and loss of international reserves-as well as considering these two components separately. We are interesting in two basic questions: Firstly, how was the transmission of the global shock affected by the extent of their international balance sheet exposure, financial development and financial openness?
1 Secondly, given the degree of exchange market pressure, what determines the tradeoff or choice between exchange rate depreciation and loss of international reserves in absorbing the shock? We sidestep in this paper questions regarding the root causes of the crisis. These issues are covered by growing literature dealing with the pre-crisis trends and policies that led to the buildup of financial vulnerabilities, and ultimately to the crisis in the US and it rapid transition to the global economy [see Obstfeld (2010) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) , and the references therein].
Our main focus in on how the global financial crisis affected emerging market economies (EMs), where we define emerging market economies according to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets index (see Table 1 , 1 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) for studies on the impact of balance sheet exposure on Financial Instability.
notes for the list of EMs). The focus on emerging markets stems from several observations. First, these countries were the source of most of the pre-crisis economic growth, and most of the global population lives there. Second, the process of globalization rapidly increased the financial and trade linkages of emerging markets with the OECD countries, relative to the more limited integration of developing, non emerging market countries. Finally, the OECD countries have had elastic access to large dollar swap lines extended by the US FED (either directly or via FED's large swap line with the ECB). Thereby, the OECD countries were able to meet excess demand for dollar liquidity by borrowing dollar reserves from the FED, facilitating the adjustment and deleveraging pressures. In contrast, most emerging markets were not able to rely on borrowed reserves via swap lines, and were thereby more exposed to the need to adjust abruptly to the global crisis.
Our results highlight the importance of total external liabilities/GDP ratio (including debt, equity, FDI and derivative products) in accounting for exchange market pressures, and the short term external debt/international reserves ratio in accounting for the higher relative importance of exchange rate depreciation in accommodating the adjustment to a given degree of exchange market pressure. Our findings also corroborate that there was a systematic variation in emerging markets exposure to EMP, and in the ways to accommodate these pressures.
Section 2 overviews the response of emerging and developing economies to the global financial shock. Section 3 applies multivariate regression analysis, explaining external vulnerability to financial shocks. Section 4 explains the tradeoff between reserve loss and exchange rate depreciation, and Section 5 concludes.
Response of Emerging and Developing Economies to the Global Financial Shock
Appendix (2005)).
As our focus is on a cross country comparison during an unprecedented global crisis,
we refrain from such normalizations. As a sensitivity analysis, we compare our EMP measure and the Weighted EMP used at the IMF's World Economic Outlook (2009).
The correlation between the two measures in highly significant at 0.63.
In summary, the global financial crisis affected countries across the globe in all regions, income levels and whether or not they had tight restrictions on capital flows.
Exchange market pressure was intense in most countries, mainly absorbed by exchange rate depreciation but also through substantial losses of international reserves.
Explaining External Vulnerability to Financial Shocks
Multivariate regression analysis of the link between EMP and selected explanatory variables in emerging markets is reported in Tables 1 and 2 [ Tables 1-2 
about here: regressions of EMP]
We find that total external liabilities are significantly (at the 1% level) and positively related to exchange market pressure (EMP) and this result is robust to every model specification, for both the short and the longer sample period. Larger external liabilities-including short-and long-term debt, equity, FDI and derivative products--made emerging markets more vulnerable to the global financial crisis.
During the peak of the crisis, balance sheet exposure is also positively related to exchange market pressure, but is not significant at conventional levels. OECD membership effect is positive and significant, raising the EMP, in line with the greater exposure of OECD countries to the US crisis. Access to a swap line reduces the EMP, as it allows meeting deleveraging pressure by borrowing reserves. The other variables investigated-capital account openness, trade openness-were not statistically significant different from zero. Similar results hold for both the shorter and the longer crisis window, though the OECD dummy and the access to the swap lines lose their significance in the longer crisis window.
The tradeoff between reserve loss and exchange rate depreciation
We observed that countries differ markedly in their response to the financial crisis Countries with few reserves relative to portfolio debt are much more likely to rely on exchange rate depreciation than use scare reserves to absorb the global financial shock. By contrast, the extent of total external liabilities does not enter significantly (as it did in explaining overall EMP). This finding is an interesting contrast to the results in Tables 1 and 2 , and suggests that the determinants of total vulnerability (EMP) are distinct from the factors that determine the tradeoff between using reserves or the exchange rate (Reserve Loss Relative to EMP). 
Conclusions
We found clear evidence that emerging markets with higher ratio of the total foreign liabilities/GDP were more vulnerable to the financial crisis. Higher balance sheet exposure (higher short term foreign debt relative to international reserves) is significantly associated with greater weight attached to currency depreciation and lower weight attached to losing international reserves as means of dealing with exchange market pressure during the crisis. While larger total external liabilities/GDP are clearly associated with larger EMP, higher ratio of external short term debt/international reserves is associated with higher weight on price adjustment (exchange rate depreciation) and lower weight on quantity adjustment (losing reserves) as a way to accommodate a given EMP. Despite the remarkable buildup of international reserves by emerging markets during the period prior to the financial crisis, emerging markets relied primarily on exchange rate depreciation rather than reserve loss to absorb most of the exchange market pressure shock-"fear of reserve loss."
These findings are consistent with the observations in Aizenman and Yi (2010) regarding emerging markets' switch during the crisis from the fear of floating [Calvo and Reinhart (2001) ] to the fear of losing reserves during the crisis. While international reserves/GDP ratios were high in most emerging markets before the crisis relative to their levels in previous crises, they rarely were high enough to cover the entire external portfolio liabilities of the affected countries. Thus, countries opted to rely on exchange rate adjustment, refraining from fast depletion of their international reserves. The reluctance to rely more on reserves depletion may reflect several concerns: fear that losing reserves too fast may propagate a run on the remaining reserves, and uncertainty about crisis duration may suggests keeping reserves to deal with future market pressure. Furthermore, at times of collapsing global demand, countries are more willing to engage in competitive depreciation, as the downside of higher inflation is sharply mitigated by the global recession.
Interestingly, we find that emerging markets relying more on commodities in their export trade are more prone to use international reserves, and try to limit exchange rate depreciation, when faced with the global financial shock. This is consistent with the notion that commodities are priced by the global market, thus commodities exporters don't benefit from depreciation, opting instead to use their reserves to absorb exchange market pressure.
Our results are also in line with Frankel and Saravelos (2010) , reporting several pre-crisis variables accounting for the 2008-09 crisis incidence. Specifically, they found that higher pre-crisis reserves/GDP and lower pre-crisis real exchange appreciation were associated with lower exchange market pressure during the crisis.
Yet, our results also suggest the importance of the ratio total external liabilities/GDP in accounting for higher exchange market pressure during the crisis. Controlling for this broad exposure measure renders balance sheet exposure insignificant.
Our results corroborate the notion that globally linked national financial markets, Tot. Liabilities (% GDP) 2.55e-07*** 2.80e-07*** 2.74e-07*** 2.74e-07*** 3.22e-07*** 2.73e-07*** 3.66e-07*** 2.99e-07*** 2.82e-07*** 2.72e-07*** 2.79e-07** Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate variables significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All independent variables as of 2007, except for Swap Lines which indicate countries that received and used a swap line during the crisis period. Sample restricted to emerging markets that experience positive EMP.
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